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Abstract
Many African countries suffered from debt overhang from the 1980s to 2000s. As debt cancel-
lation schemes freed the African countries from debt burden, the formerly indebted countries
(re)gained access to external borrowing. Using panel data of 36 countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa, including 28 heavily indebted poor countries from 2005 to 2016, the impacts of external
debts on the countries’ macroeconomy, especially on consumption and domestic investment, are
tested. Statistics suggest the possibility that current SSA external borrowing is contributing to
the economies’ stabilization. However, the regression results show that the current external debt
does not foster domestic investment. Despite the favourable economic situation with access to
international capital, the dependence on external debt is risky for SSA governments given the
changes in the international market.
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Figure 1. External debt stock by region (current, trillion US$)
Source: International Debt Statistics 2018. Public and publicly guaranteed debt, excluding
high-income countries.
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Figure 2. Weighted external debt stock of the Sub-Saharan Africa, 1996-2016
Source: International Debt Statistics 2018. Sum of 36 sample countries, weighted by exports.
The completion of the debt cancellation process was an obvious go-signal for some SSA gov-
ernments to approach the international capital market. In fact, the debt cancellation was not
necessarily a requirement for the issuance of sovereign bonds in the foreign market (Eurobond).
According to Mecagni et al. (2014) and the IMF (2016), most external sovereign bond issuances
by African HIPCs occurred well before the completion of debt cancellation, and some countries
used the Eurobond proceeds to restructure their debt. The debt maturity (tenor) of Eurobonds
issued by SSA countries (including non-HIPCs, excluding South Africa) is 11 years, and the
coupon rate is 8.3% on average as of 2014 (Mecagni et al. 2014:7).
According to the International Debt Statistics 2018, Guinea (2004), Ghana (2004), Senegal
(2009), Zambia (2012), Uganda (2012), Rwanda (2013), Mozambique (2013), Ethiopia (2014),
Cameroon (2014), Madagascar (2014), and Côte d’Ivoire (2014) issued the Eurobond for the
1. Introduction
Since the 1980s, many developing countries, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
suffered from the external debt problem. When the international special scheme for debt
cancellation was initiated, 33 out of the 39 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) were SSA
countries. To date, 30 out of 33 African HIPCs have already reached the completion point (IMF
2018).1 The bilateral debt cancellation was followed by the multilateral debt cancellation under
the Multilateral Debt Restructuring Initiative (MDRI), and in most of the countries, a large part
of the external debts was forgiven in the 2000s.
As the debt burden was removed, SSA countries, including former HIPCs, started to borrow
externally. Their newly gained access to external capital was a big change in the financial
environment and has also brought changes in their domestic economies.
The increasing trend of external debt among developing economies was a universal phe-
nomenon in the 2000s, including among SSA countries (Figure 1). The trend indicates the
inclusion of less developed economies into the international financial market. In the meantime,
most developing economies enlarged their scale of international trade and GDP. The export-
weighted debt is hence not necessarily explosive in relative terms. The increase in the value of
external trade by SSA countries also suppressed the average debt share in export to around 25%
after 2010 (Figure 2).
However, the recent external borrowing by SSA countries is not without reservation. The
resolution of the old debt problem does not necessarily mean that their economic structure has
changed and the same problem will never be repeated. The following discussion is based on
the concern about whether Africa’s new debt and economic situations are different from the old
ones that brought about the debt crisis.
1.1. External debt
Aside from the international action for debt cancellation, on the background of increasing the
external debt of African countries, there exist international investors who searched for higher
yield during the period of low international interest rates. Figure 3 shows a comparison of
various interest rates. Since the recent international financial crisis, international interest rates
(LIBOR, US Treasury bill rate) have been even lower than the average official interest rates for
SSA countries. The flow of capital into the emerging and developing economies, including the
SSA countries, was further pushed by the high international commodity prices. On the other
hand, Figure 3 also shows that the interest rates the SSA governments had to pay for issuing
domestic bonds and treasury bills have been quite high partly because of their shallow domestic
financial market, so that external borrowing became a very attractive option.
After the debt cancellation, bilateral and multilateral lending to former HIPCs have resumed.
1Both HIPC and non-HIPC countries such as Kenya and Nigeria benefited from the debt cancellation (Merotto et al.
2015 ).
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by the share of natural resources in the total goods export by SSA countries, is increasing year
by year. This reflects the high international resource prices in the 2000s on one hand, and on
the other, suggests that majority of SSA countries are not succeeding in diversifying the revenue
source and economic structures.
It is a stylized fact in the literature that resource-dependent economies are unstable, eco-
nomically and politically, and prone to shocks. The problems of economies with abundant
exhaustible natural resources and economic dependence on them are often discussed as ‘re-
source curse’ (Auty 1990, Gelb et al.1988, Sachs and Warner 2001). A wide range of problems,
from changes in exchange rate and industrial structure (Dutch disease) to corruption, incidence
of violence, and domestic conflicts, are included in the resource curse (Corden and Neary 1982,
Corden 1984, Karl 1997, Collier and Hoeﬄer 2000). On the other hand, Van der Ploeg and
Poelhekke (2009) argue that the resource price volatility is negatively correlated with per capita
output growth, and growth volatility is higher in resource-dependent countries. This suggestion
is noteworthy given the analysis by Ramey and Ramey (1995) that volatile economies in general
grow slower.
While natural resource abundance and dependence are old problems and present conventional
challenges to many developing countries, it is worth noting that natural resource abundance post
debt cancellation can have a different meaning, as the future natural resource revenue can be
viewed as the collateral for external debt, which enables external borrowing even for a relatively
low-income country (Ketkar and Ratha 2009).3 Moreover, it is widely known that some coun-
tries, especially China, are offering loans (or grants) in exchange for the natural resources. Such
decisions can be also backed by the recent high prices of the resources.
Among the economic problems stemming from natural resources, one problem closely linked
to external debt and capital inflow is the procyclicality of the macroeconomy. For resource-
rich countries, external credit often tends to be readily available when the resource revenue is
high and the economy is buoyant, but it becomes more costly and harder when the economy
slows down, which is exactly when the government is in need of hard currency. Aside from
this problem, most African countries suffer from weak tax collection systems, which lead to
chronic budget deficits in meeting the high demand for spending on development projects. In
countries where fiscal rules are not established or institutionalized, government expenditure
easily increases when revenue and capital inflow increase, but it is difficult to reduce spending
even when revenue decreases. Alesina et al. (2008) analyse the reason for fiscal procyclicality
in developing countries based on a theoretical model and empirical tests. They conclude that
governments spend more on the demands of voters, and more corrupt governments tend to
3The distinction between resource abundance and resource dependence is critical. Determining how the resource
endowment is measured has been an issue in examining the existence of the ‘resource curse’ (e.g., see Alexeev and
Conrad 2009). On the other hand, in this analysis, resource dependence is the focus since it suggests the absence
of other industries within the economy to buffer the resource price and revenue volatility. Resource abundance does
not necessarily mean economic dependence.
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Figure 3. Interest rates, 1996-2016
Source: LIBOR, US T-bill rate, and SSA T-bill rate are based on IFS, and the interest rates for external
debt are based on the International Debt Statistics.
Note: SSA T-bill rate is the average of 19 countries from the sample. Interest rates for external public
and publicly guaranteed debts (to official/private creditors) are averages of the sample countries, and
the rates are the average of the interest on new external debt commitments.
first time (The World Bank 2018a), and some of there countries issued it again in the succeeding
years (years of the first issuance of Eurobond in parentheses).2 Several countries also succeeded
in issuing a private (publicly non-guaranteed) Eurobond. The share of the Eurobond and external
bank loans in the total debt of the SSA countries is still small, given the fact that bilateral and
multilateral debts share the majority of external borrowing for most of the SSA. However, the
debt cancellation has changed the financial environment, especially for SSA governments,as it
offers new options for financing their deficit.
1.2. Conventional challenges and new debts
The SSA countries experienced relatively fast growth in the 2000s, especially compared with
the 1980s and 1990s. One important factor supporting the growth was the commodity boom.
International commodity prices, especially those of natural resources such as metals and energy
increased in the 2000s. There was a volatile period around 2007 and 2008, but prices remained
high compared with the 1990s. The high prices have fostered new exploration and development
of new natural resource production projects, even in geographically and politically difficult areas
in the SSA. Today, majority of SSA countries, though in varying degrees, export mining-related
natural resources. While the volume of natural resource export differs by country, the sample
statistics (explained in the next section) show that their dependence on resource export, measured
2As in the case of Mozambique, in some countries, ‘sovereign debt’ is sometimes issued through an unofficial opaque
process, and the debt statistics may be understating the reality of debt.
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External debts of a country consist of bank loan and bond, both public (‘public and pub-
licly guaranteed,’ PPG) and private (‘publicly non-guaranteed,’ PNG). In addition, developing
economies receive bilateral and multilateral loans, both concessional and non-concessional. Re-
garding the sample countries, the composition of external debt varies from country to country,
but bilateral and multilateral debts still share the majority of debt for SSA countries. Given
that, for most countries, the debt problems of the 1980s and 1990s arose due to the accumula-
tion of bilateral and multilateral debt, the situation of public-led capital flow has not changed
dramatically.
The debt statistics are obtained from the International Debt Statistics 2018 (The World Bank
2018a), and macroeconomic indicators are obtained from the World Development Indicators
(World Bank 2018b). In using the debt data, some studies use the net statistics (such as net
transfer) of debt flow. However, as Powell and Tavella (2015) discuss, cancelling out the inflow
and outflow of capital leads to loss of information on the capital movement, because large
capital inflow is often associated with large outflow. Therefore, in this analysis, the inflow
(disbursement) is used to capture the flow of external capital as debt.4
The official debt information is recorded by international institutions, and the statistics are
recently compiled under the Joint External Debt Hub by the Bank for International Settlements,
International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and
the World Bank. On the other hand, despite its large existence in the African economies, the
official statistics for Chinese loans are not obtainable. In this analysis, the estimates of Chinese
loans are considered based on the database constructed by the China Africa Research Initiative
at Johns Hopkins University (China Africa Research Initiative 2018).
Trade statistics of SSA countries often suffer serious defects, and there are often huge gaps
between the figures reported by different data sources. In this analysis, the export statistics
are based on the UN Comtrade database, but taken in the reverse way. That is, the export of
SSA countries is calculated as the sum of imports by other countries (reporters) in the world,
as long as they are in the database. The import statistics reported in UN Comtrade is CIF
data (including cost, insurance, and freight), and the export statistics are FOB data (free on
board). Thus, the export and import values differ in exclusion (inclusion) of insurance and
freight besides cost, and therefore this method overstates the export values and understates the
import values. Nonetheless, the reversed trade statistics are the best available approximate for
the sample countries to maximize the data coverage of the countries.
To control the dependence on natural resources, the share of natural resource export is also
calculated using theUNComtrade database. Natural resource here include oil and ores (specified
under the UN HS codes 26 and 27) and the articles thereof (specified under the UN HS codes
71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80 and 81). Summary statistics are reported in Appendix C.
4In the previous versions of the analysis, the outflow of capital, amortization of debt, and interest payment were
also included in the analysis. However, as amortization usually takes place regularly at a constant amount, no
statistically significant results were obtained.
have a procyclical fiscal policy. Thornton (2008) also analyses the economic procyclicality of
African countries using data from 37 African countries and shows that their consumption is
more procyclical than the economy itself. On the other hand, Berg et al. (2013) discuss the
procyclicality of resource-dependent economies and analyse the validity of resource funds to
stabilize the economy by enabling countercyclical government spending.
The nature of the international capital flow is indeed procyclical: Capital flows in when the
economy is growing, and the flow reverses when the economy is slowing down. The litera-
ture suggests that resource abundance is a disadvantage for developing economies and resource
dependence should be overcome, but economic procyclicality (or the ‘boom and bust’) is also
often discussed as one of the challenges for stabilization of the economies, regardless of natural
resource dependence. Easterly et al. (2000) highlight that the stability of growth is correlated
with higher growth, and they additionally suggest that financial development is important for
stabilizing the growth. Related to this point, Talvi and Végh (2005) reveal the contrasting facts
between developing and developed economies that while fiscal policies in developing countries
tend to be procyclical, the they tend to be acyclical or countercyclical in developed economies.
Using a similar argument, Alesina et al. (2008) conclude that procyclical governments incur a
large debt when the economy is buoyant. Frankel et al. (2013), on the other hand suggest that
institutional quality has a strong correlation with the countercyclicality of fiscal policy.
These previous findings leave us with several questions related to the procyclicality of the
new external borrowings by SSA countries. The first question is about whether resource-rich
countries are externally borrowing more, given the recognition of future resource revenue as a
collateral for external borrowing. The second question is about procyclicality and whether recent
external borrowing is cyclical to the economic conditions of debtor countries.The third question
is whether the negative correlation between government fiscal procyclicality and growth, as
suggested by Talvi and Végh (2005), is also applicable to SSA countries in the new debt period.
The final question is more fundamental: Are the new external borrowings contributing to
investment, or are they consumed, and by whom?
The rest of this paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 describes the data and model
specification. Section 3 addresses the first three questions regarding procyclicality. Section
4 discusses the econometric model to address the third question and presents the regression
results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
A panel dataset is used in this analysis that consists of debt and macroeconomic statistics of 36
countries in the SSA, including 28 HIPCs, for the period from 2005 to 2016. Several countries,
such as Angola and Nigeria, are excluded due to the large scale of their economies. Some
observations are missing depending on the country and year, and this resulted in an unbalanced
panel. The list of the countries is presented in Appendix B.
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Table 1. Correlations between output growth and external debt
ppg disbursement png disbursement total disbursement
gdpg -0.0019 -0.0126 -0.0046
(0.9586) (0.7289) (0.8982)
with 1 year lag of gdpg -0.0078 -0.0131 -0.0105
(0.8345) (0.7242) (0.7768)
with up to 2-year lags of gdpg 0.0130 0.0030 0.0134
(0.7328) (0.9366) (0.7245)
with up to 3-year lags of gdpg 0.0238 -0.0062 0.0219
(0.5415) (0.8727) (0.5739)
Note: P-values are in parentheses. gdpg denotes GDP growth rate, and ppg and png denote ‘public
and publicly guaranteed’ and ‘publicly non-guaranteed’ debt, respectively. Debt disbursement is
denominated by export value to control the economic size.
Given that neither the natural resource nor high economic growth is enabling external bor-
rowing by SSA countries, it is worthto examine the characteristics of countries that have access
to external capital. Asiedo (2003) and Djimeu (2018) offer a hint regrading this point. They
suggest the importance of the institutional quality of SSA countries for attracting foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) and ensuring growth after debt relief. Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of
institutional quality and external disbursement in 2016. The countries with higher institutional
quality have relatively larger external borrowing. This positive correlation is stable since 2009
and 2010 even if another index of institutional quality or detailed statistics for debt disbursement
is taken, or another year is taken. However, before 2009, positive relations between institutional
quality and bilateral and multilateral disbursement are absent (the index for institutional quality
is only available since 2005). This suggests a possibility that public loan conditions for the
SSA have changed since 2009 or the institutions of loan-taking countries have improved. A
further investigation is beyond the scope of this study, but the bottom line is that as the external
borrowing of the SSA increased after 2009, international capital flowed into the economies with
higher institutional quality.
3.3. Government fiscal procyclicality and external debt
The existing literature suggests that economic volatility is negatively correlated with growth
(Ramey and Ramey 1995, Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009). This point is tested with the
current dataset. Figure 6 shows the scattered plot of growth volatility (standard deviation of the
annual growth rate) and long-term growth rate (mean for the period between 1996 and 2016).
The negative correlation is in accordance with the existing studies, suggesting that the higher
the economic volatility, the lower the long-term growth rate.
On the other hand, Talvi and Végh (2005) suggest a positive correlation between economic
volatility and government fiscal procyclicality. Based on the current sample, Figure 7 shows
the correlation between growth volatility and the government fiscal procyclicality calculated
as the covariance of GDP and government consumption. The results should not be compared
directly, as Talvi and Végh (2005) use the standard deviation of real output as the measure
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Note: Resource dependence is calculated as the resource export divided by total goods
export (UN Comtrade), and the debt disbursement is denominated by total export to control
the economic size. For statistical details, see Appendix.
3. External debt and procyclicality
3.1. Resource dependence and external debt
Resource abundant countries may be able to incur debt using the natural resource as de facto
collateral. However, movement of the international commodity prices will directly affect the
value of the collateral, and thus the capacity to access the external credit increases when resource
revenue is high, which can lead to procyclical government spending. In this context, as Van
der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) argue, the linkage between natural resource dependence and
external debt may exacerbate the volatility of the economy.
Figure 4 shows the plot of correlations between resource dependence (country mean for
the sample period) and external debt disbursement (weighted by export) for 2016. It shows
a clear negative correlation, and the tendency does not change in different years, even when
debt disbursement is replaced by total debt stock. Against the expectation, existence of the
natural resource and the future prospect of resource revenue does not necessarily result in more
external borrowing. While the sample excludes some big economies, such as Angola and
Nigeria, inclusion of those countries does not affect the negative correlation between resource
dependence. This suggests that mere abundance of natural resources does not grant access to
credit.
3.2. External debt and procyclicality
If the government of faster growing countries are borrowing more, it suggests an existence of
economic procyclicality. Table 1 shows the partial correlations between external debt and output
growth rate of the sample countries. Various lags are included, but none of the correlations are
statistically significant, suggesting that there is no correlation between past and current growth
and external debt disbursement. This at least suggests that recent external borrowing by the SSA
countries is not triggered by their rapid growth.
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In an economic sense, the borrowed money needs to be invested in productive projects so
that the debt can be paid back in the future with interest. However, in reality, external debt,
especially concessional debt tends to be incurred and granted to support a consumption of the
government in trouble. The discussion about the purpose of international aid is clearer on
this point. Burnside and Dollar (1998) argue that if the development aid is not allocated for
productive investment, it should support the consumption of the poor. In case of aid for very
poor countries, they suggest that supporting the consumption is not necessarily a problem, but
‘the issue is, whose consumption’ (ibid.:10). The discussion about aid should not simply be
applied to public loans and sovereign debts, as the difference between aid and sovereign debt is
vague, especially for developing countries.
Based on this understanding, the econometric model is specified to observe the influence
of external debt on investment and consumption. As Talvi and Végh (2005) point out, it is
often very difficult to classify government spending into investment and consumption. While
this is basically due to the limitation of the official statistics, they also argue that government
investment in unproductive projects should be regarded as consumption since it does not produce
future revenue, although the criteria for classifying productive and unproductive project is very
vague. In this study, consumption is categorized as private or government, although government
consumption may include investment. On the other hand, investment statistics do not distinguish
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Figure 5. Institutional quality and external debt, 2016
Note: The index for institutional quality is taken from Country Policy and In-
stitutional Assessment by theWorld Bank. For details of statistics, see Appendix.
of economic volatility.5 Nonetheless, it is interesting that, contrary to their suggestion, the
correlation between economic volatility and government fiscal procyclicality is negative for the
SSA countries, suggesting that the higher the government fiscal procyclicality, the lower the
growth volatility. Figure 8 further shows that the higher the government fiscal procyclicality, the
higher the rate of long-term growth. Finally, Figure 9 shows the positive correlation between
long-term growth rate and government external debt procyclicality measured as the covariance
between external debt disbursement and government consumption. These correlations suggest
that recent African government spending is positively affecting the economies’ stabilization, and
government spending supported by external debt is associated with higher long-term growth
rate. Given the relatively large economic share of the government sector in SSA countries, these
results should not be surprising. The private sector is still small in African countries; thus,
government consumption has a large influence on the whole macroeconomy, and government
spending can be strongly linked to external borrowing.
4. External debt for investment or for consumption?
Externally raised capital is often used to finance the current account deficit in developing
countries. The question then is, what is imported? This is indeed a recurrent question, as Wall
(1968) discusses the relationship between import and growth (in criticizing Raúl Prebisch for
his argument of ‘trade, but not aid’) stating that if the import is to serve for economic growth, it
needs to be of capital goods, not consumer goods.
5The difficulty in calculating real values for the statistics of African countries hinders the usage of the equivalent
statistics in this analysis.
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‘the issue is, whose consumption’ (ibid.:10). The discussion about aid should not simply be
applied to public loans and sovereign debts, as the difference between aid and sovereign debt is
vague, especially for developing countries.
Based on this understanding, the econometric model is specified to observe the influence
of external debt on investment and consumption. As Talvi and Végh (2005) point out, it is
often very difficult to classify government spending into investment and consumption. While
this is basically due to the limitation of the official statistics, they also argue that government
investment in unproductive projects should be regarded as consumption since it does not produce
future revenue, although the criteria for classifying productive and unproductive project is very
vague. In this study, consumption is categorized as private or government, although government
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Note: The index for institutional quality is taken from Country Policy and In-
stitutional Assessment by theWorld Bank. For details of statistics, see Appendix.
of economic volatility.5 Nonetheless, it is interesting that, contrary to their suggestion, the
correlation between economic volatility and government fiscal procyclicality is negative for the
SSA countries, suggesting that the higher the government fiscal procyclicality, the lower the
growth volatility. Figure 8 further shows that the higher the government fiscal procyclicality, the
higher the rate of long-term growth. Finally, Figure 9 shows the positive correlation between
long-term growth rate and government external debt procyclicality measured as the covariance
between external debt disbursement and government consumption. These correlations suggest
that recent African government spending is positively affecting the economies’ stabilization, and
government spending supported by external debt is associated with higher long-term growth
rate. Given the relatively large economic share of the government sector in SSA countries, these
results should not be surprising. The private sector is still small in African countries; thus,
government consumption has a large influence on the whole macroeconomy, and government
spending can be strongly linked to external borrowing.
4. External debt for investment or for consumption?
Externally raised capital is often used to finance the current account deficit in developing
countries. The question then is, what is imported? This is indeed a recurrent question, as Wall
(1968) discusses the relationship between import and growth (in criticizing Raúl Prebisch for
his argument of ‘trade, but not aid’) stating that if the import is to serve for economic growth, it
needs to be of capital goods, not consumer goods.
5The difficulty in calculating real values for the statistics of African countries hinders the usage of the equivalent
statistics in this analysis.
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the tendency of the Chinese loan receivers. When the investment is measured by the gross fixed
capital formation (regressions 1 and 2), the technical grant (tech.grant) is positively correlated
with investment. Resource dependence (resource.r.ct) has a negative coefficient, suggesting
that resource-dependent countries tend to invest less, though they do import more capital goods
when resource revenue (D.resource) increases. Changes in nominal exchange rate (mpd.ex.r) are
negatively correlated with domestic investment, suggesting that currency depreciation negatively
affects domestic investment. Changes in the index of institutional quality (D.CPIA.public)
are positively correlated with investment, suggesting that improvement in institutional quality
(measured as the quality of public sector management) is associated with increases in domestic
investment.
4.2.2. External debt and consumption
Table 3 reports the regressions of consumption on external debt. For government consumption,
bilateral debt is correlated negatively. This implies that bilateral loans to SSA countries tend
to be countercyclical. However, the coefficients of multilateral debts are larger, positive, and
statistically significant. This suggests that multilateral debt disbursement fosters government
consumption. For consumer goods imports, bank loans are negatively correlated, but the reason
is unclear from this analysis. On the other hand, external bond is negatively correlated with
private consumption while bank loan is positively correlated with private consumption. This
can be interpreted to mean that disbursement of sovereign bond is functioning countercyclically,
but the linkage and time lags between the government decision of sovereign debt issuance
and negative shocks in private consumption are unclear. On the other hand, Chinese loans
are positively correlated with private consumption. Again, this may indicate the existence
of bias that Chinese loans are granted to countries whose market is large and consumption
growth is strong. Resource dependence has no correlation with consumption, although an
increase in resource revenue is positively correlated with increases in government consumption
and consumer goods import. The exchange rate is correlated negatively with all indicators of
consumption, suggesting that currency depreciation negatively affects consumption behaviour.
The coefficient is especially large (with a negative sign) for private consumption, and this should
reflect the fact that private consumption is strongly affected by the cost of imported goods.
Finally, institutional quality has no correlation with consumption.
between private-led or public-led.
To capture the movements in domestic investment, two different statistics, capital goods
import (ct.k) and gross fixed capital formation (gfkf ) are used. The former statistics are based
on the assumption that external borrowing must be closely related to changes in imports, while
the latter are understood as changes in domestic investment as a result of trade and transactions.
To capture the changes in consumption, three different statistics are employed. Consumer goods
import (ct.cons) is assumed to reflect the changes in imports closely related to consumption, while
private consumption (p.cons) and government consumption (gov.cons) reflect consumption of
the private and public sectors respectively. Categorization of imported goods into consumer
goods and capital goods is based on the UN Comtrade Broad Economic Categories.
4.1. Model
The regression models are specified for investment and consumption separately, as following.
∆Investmenti,t = α + β1Debt + β2Xi,t + λi + εi,t, (1)
∆Consumptioni,t = c + θ1Debt + θ2Xi,t + µi + i,t . (2)
∆Investmenti,t denotes domestic investment (first difference), and ∆Consumptioni,t denotes
consumption (first difference). Debt is the vector of public debt disbursements, as described
below. Xi,t is the vector of control variables such as grants, technical grants, FDI inflow, exchange
rate, resource dependence, resource revenue changes, and changes in institutional quality. λi, µi
are country-specific time-invariant effects, and εi,t, i,t are error terms. The regressions are run
as the fixed effect model.
External debts are categorized into four basic types: bank loans, bonds, bilateral loans, and
multilateral loans. Bank loans and bonds are further categorized as public and private. Bilateral
and multilateral loans are further categorized as concessional and non-concessional. As is clear
from the Figures A.1 and A.2, the majority of external borrowing by SSA countries is public. For
this reason, only public debt information is used in the regression analysis. Both multilateral and
bilateral loans include concessional and non-concessional debts. For all variables, stationarity
is checked beforehand by unit root tests.6 The list and detailed definitions of the variables are
shown in Appendix D.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. External debt and investment
Table 2 reports the regressions of investment on external debt. Surprisingly, none of the debt
variables are statistically significant except for Chinese loans, suggesting that external debt
after 2005 is does not affect the domestic investment of debtor countries. Chinese loans are
negatively correlated with the domestic investment, but this may indicate not the causality but
6Results of the unit root test are not reported but provided on request.
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5. Conclusion
This study analysed the nature and influence of new external debt on SSA countries after
cancellation of the old debt. The results suggest that the new debt disbursement is not based
on the favourable economic situation of debtor countries. This clearly reflects the fact that new
African debt is not yet purely market-based, and the main actors are not private companies
but still governments. Recently. the economies of SSA countries have been growing, and
government spending associated with obtainable external loans is an important factor behind
this growth. This can be understood as an evidence of the international capital market (re)gaining
its function in helping the macroeconomic stabilization of developing countries after the debt
cancellation. However, as the international market tightens, the sustainability of new debts
becomes a concern. For example, Ghana has rolled over its Eurobond issued in 2007 (US$750
mil., 8.5%, 10 years) in 2016, with a higher interest rate and shorter period (US$750mil., 9.25%,
5 years). While the majority of bilateral and multilateral lending is still concessional, the share
is declining by year, and the past experience of HIPCs that accumulated bilateral and multilateral
debts suggests that it does not warrant an optimistic view. What is equally serious, based on the
regression analysis, is that the new debt disbursement after the debt cancellation is fostering not
investment but consumption, and this result is consistent with other studies showing that debt
cancellation in African counties did not boost domestic investment.
After the recent changes in the financial environments of SSA countries, these countries have
already passed the crisis period and have been welcomed into the international capital market.
However, this analysis suggests that the current debt still supports government consumption.
According to Burnside and Dollar (1998), this implies that capital flows to SSA countries are
still of the old type: money to support the consumption of the poor through government con-
sumption, although the reality may differ by country. SSA economies are becoming more open
to the international market, but whether the situation under the African new external debt is
really ‘new’ requires a further look.
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5. Conclusion
This study analysed the nature and influence of new external debt on SSA countries after
cancellation of the old debt. The results suggest that the new debt disbursement is not based
on the favourable economic situation of debtor countries. This clearly reflects the fact that new
African debt is not yet purely market-based, and the main actors are not private companies
but still governments. Recently. the economies of SSA countries have been growing, and
government spending associated with obtainable external loans is an important factor behind
this growth. This can be understood as an evidence of the international capital market (re)gaining
its function in helping the macroeconomic stabilization of developing countries after the debt
cancellation. However, as the international market tightens, the sustainability of new debts
becomes a concern. For example, Ghana has rolled over its Eurobond issued in 2007 (US$750
mil., 8.5%, 10 years) in 2016, with a higher interest rate and shorter period (US$750mil., 9.25%,
5 years). While the majority of bilateral and multilateral lending is still concessional, the share
is declining by year, and the past experience of HIPCs that accumulated bilateral and multilateral
debts suggests that it does not warrant an optimistic view. What is equally serious, based on the
regression analysis, is that the new debt disbursement after the debt cancellation is fostering not
investment but consumption, and this result is consistent with other studies showing that debt
cancellation in African counties did not boost domestic investment.
After the recent changes in the financial environments of SSA countries, these countries have
already passed the crisis period and have been welcomed into the international capital market.
However, this analysis suggests that the current debt still supports government consumption.
According to Burnside and Dollar (1998), this implies that capital flows to SSA countries are
still of the old type: money to support the consumption of the poor through government con-
sumption, although the reality may differ by country. SSA economies are becoming more open
to the international market, but whether the situation under the African new external debt is
really ‘new’ requires a further look.
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C. Summary statistics
mean sd min max observations
gfkf 3.06 3.71 0.02 28.83 398
ct.k 0.80 0.89 0.02 5.31 432
gov.cons 1.75 1.71 0.05 9.42 409
ct.cons 0.83 0.84 0.03 4.90 432
p.cons 8.13 9.50 0.00 56.05 432
fdi 0.40 0.67 -0.68 5.50 428
tech.grant 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.36 432
grants 0.67 0.92 0.00 6.98 432
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ppg.mi.dis 0.16 0.21 0.00 1.67 432
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